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A critical evaluation of two recent discussions of 
applications of the argument from self-referential 
consistency (ASRC) will be examined here. In the first 
paper Patrica Smith Churchland attempts to undermine 
John Eccles' argument that determinism is self-refu-
ting.1 In the second paper Nicholas Everitt argues 
that the position of "straight forward eliminative 
materialism" (SEM) meets the same fate.2 Here, I will 
argue that the arguments of Churchland and Everitt are 
unsound and that Churchland in particular has seriously 
mis-stated the position of a non-trivally absurd 
libertarianism. However, the self-referential argu-
ments against both determinism and eliminative materi-
alism can be met by champions of these positions. The 
arguments are in fact question begging. 
1. What IS ASRC?3 
A position criticized by an ASRC is taken to imply 
either its own falsity, its own meaninglessness or 
indeterminancy of truth-value, although by far the most 
common strategy is to argue that some position implies 
its own falsity. Such ASRC arguments can be contrasted 
to the liar paradox. In the liar paradox we are asked 
to consider a sentence: 
(L) This sentence is false. 
The familiar paradox arises through considering the 
truth-value of (L): (L) is true if and only if it is 
false, and false if and only if it is true. An ASRC 
argument against a position P would lead to the conclu-
sion that P is false if it is true, and if false, then 
it is false. From the perspective of two-valued logic 
P must be necessarily false. "P" is a conjunction of 
sentences SI & S2 & S3 &...& Sn that a champion of a 
position would assent to as being an adequate descrip-
tion of such a point of view. Such an argument we call 
a semantic self-referential argument (SSRA). 
There are very few examples of SSRA in the litera-
ture. Perhaps the most well known argument is one 
directed against the verificationist theory of meaning 
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stated by the logical positivist movement in its early 
days: the principle itself seemed to be condemned to 
the dark damp domain of the cognitively meaningless, 
being neither analytically true (nor a contradiction) 
nor directly confirmed by sensory observations. For 
the most part most ASRC have been pragmatic self-refer-
ential arguments (PSRA). By use of the term "pragmat-
ic" I refer to all those aspects of a language in which 
explicit reference to a speaker is made.4 Among the 
pragmatic concepts of a language we find the following 
assortment: "Subject S knows that P," "S justifiably 
believes P," "S argues thesis T", and so on. An exam-
ple of a popular PSRA is the dogmatists' response to 
the sceptic who claims that one is not the slightest 
bit reasonable in believing any proposition5: the 
sceptic by the performance of the speech act of advanc-
ing such a thesis within the domain of philosophical 
discussion is advancing a thesis for our reasoned 
evaluation. But if this is so, the argument defeats 
itself. 
The dogmatist's argument can be met by the sceptic, 
by a strategy through which very many PSRA can be met: 
it in fact begs the question at issue. Our thorough 
going sceptic would warmly embrace irrationalism and 
would hardly respect the yoke of rationalism. Scepti-
cism would be seen as a medicine for curing us of our 
dreaded epistemic diseases, which destroys both itself 
and the disease in the process. The self-referential 
arguments against determinism and eliminative material-
ism will fail, I will argue, for the reason of being 
question begging. 
Before turning to a consideration of Churchland and 
Everitt's papers, one argument which would seem to rule 
out this inquiry needs brief consideration. Bertrand 
Russell's ban upon all self-referential statements 
because they violate what he called "the vicious circle 
principle"6 would, if satisfactory, constitute grounds 
for rejecting any ASRC. However one of the conse-
quences of Russell's ban is that it leads us directly 
to the paradox of the non-communicator.7 So even if we 
were to regiment language to avoid all self-referential 
statements we would not escape paradox. Since the 
paradox of the non-communicator follows from Russell's 
theory of types together with semantic principles which 
Russell himself would have accepted, avoiding ASRC by 
this strategy is quite problematic.8 
2. A Critique of Churchland's Criticism of Eccles 
A champion of a PSRA argument against determinism 
must assume that the thesis of the compatibility of 
determinism and freedom of will is false. If compati-
bilism was true, then the philosophical problem of 
freedom versus determinism would be solved. John 
Eccles is an incompatibilist: indeed the act of denying 
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free will presupposes, he believes, free will to make 
this very denial. If determinism was true, then our 
very reasoning for determinism is "merely the automatic 
response of a nervous system built by genetic coding 
and molded by conditioning"9 and this for Eccles is in-
consistent with the conduct of reasoned argument. 
Churchland's counter-argument to Eccles' PSRA con-
sists in the claim that such a PSRA begs the question 
at issue. She states: 
If determinism is correct, it does not in the 
least follow that we do not reason, that our 
behaviour is the outcome of compulsion rather 
than ratiocination. On the contrary, what fol-
lows is that our reasoning and our reasoned 
behaviour is causally produced. So far from de-
nying that humans are purposeful and reasonable, 
determinism is the thesis that there is a causal 
network which produces such behaviour.10 
The anti-determinist on the other hand must "show that 
acting for a reason is uncaused behaviour."11 ~TT~anti-
determinism is false, then human action must be then 
said, in Churchland's opinion, to be "contra-causally 
produced." 
She compares the PSRA against determinism with a 
PSRA which could be made by the vital ist against the 
mechanist; and both she and Paul Churchland12 seem to 
consider the argument as being fairly decisive. The 
anti-vitalist's PSRA is this: if anti-vitalism was 
true, then there would be no vital spirit. But if 
there was no vital spirit a necessary condition for en-
gaging in debate cannot be met, since the anti-vitalist 
would have to deny that s/he is alive, and this is a 
pragmatic contradiction. The argument is a non 
sequitur because there exists an alternative non-
vitalist research programme, which challenges an unde-
fended premise of the vitalists' argument; that life 
cannot be explained by any theory which does not incor-
porate vital spirit as its generative mechanism in the 
understanding of life processes. 
Such argument shows that the PSRA has presupposed a 
false premise (or at least un undefended one) in the 
advancement of the argument. It does not show that the 
type of argument in question is invalid. There does in 
fact seem to be at least one position which can be 
clearly refuted: if a position was committed to af-
firming as true that nothing in the universe existed in 
any form of being at all, champions of such a position 
would be obviously defeated by a PSRA. It is difficult 
to imagine what could lead us to believe that this 
world was in actual fact the null-world. However the 
position does not seem to be capable of refutation by a 
SSRA, unless defenders of the ontological argument for 
the necessary existence of God are correct and that a 
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null-world is not even rationally contemplatable. So 
what is at issue is the truth or falsity of the ASRC 
champions' argument. Churchland's vitalism/anti-
vitalism analogy merely serves to draw to our attention 
the misconstruction made of the debate by the anti-
vitalist. 
Churchland's criticism of Eccles' PSRA must now be 
that in some way such an argument misconstructs the 
free will-determinism debate. I will argue that 
Eccles' PSRA does in fact do this. However, Churchland 
has herself misconstructed the free will-determinism 
debate. Consequently, both parties have clouded rather 
than cleared these issues. 
Let us first outline what is incorrect in Church-
land's construction of the free will/determinism 
debate. The passages from her essay cited earlier in-
dicate that she believes that determinists hold that 
our reasoning is "causally produced." Anti-
determinists must therefore hold that such acts, 
perhaps the paradigm example of free and purposive are 
"uncaused" and hence "contra-causally produced." Some 
anti-determinists may describe themselves as "contra-
causalists," but if they are committed to claiming that 
human free action is a mysterious interference in 
nature their position will suffer great problems on 
many fronts. Would free human action for example be a 
miracle? If so, one must now face all the traditional 
problems which this proposal involves. Perhaps these 
problems could be solved, but it is a price which the 
anti-determinist need not pay. 
The anti-determinist need not claim that free ac-
tion is uncaused and has no causal antecedents. Indeed 
one could as an anti-determinist grant that there is a 
set of causally antecedent conditions which are neces-
sary for the performance of an allegedly free act Fl. 
To be an anti-determinist one must deny that that Fl is 
the result of a set of conditions S which are causally 
sufficient for it. The universe for the determinist 
would appear to be one in which, given the state of the 
universe prior to my action Fl, I "could not have done 
otherwise" than Fl. Explicating this phrase is a quite 
difficult and controversial matter, but I need not en-
ter this debate to make my point against Churchland. 
Determinists do in fact believe that human behaviour is 
very strongly under the compulsive sway of natural law, 
so strongly that I could not do other than Fl given the 
prior state of the universe. However, they need not 
embrace the thesis of fatalism: that I will do Fl 
regardless of my beliefs, and whatever else I do. The 
Fatalist would claim that our lives in" all respects 
resemble Oedipus' pitiful attempts to avoid his fore-
casted doom. But it was true before Oedipus' birth, 
and for the vulgar fatalist impossible for him to avoid 
his fate by his own actions. The determinist need not 
view things so pessimistically: if Oedipus did avoid 
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his fate, it does not follow that his evasive actions 
were done freely. 
Determinism then might well be true even if fatal-
ism is false.13 However, whatever answer is given to 
this question, it does seem that determinists wish to 
say much more than that human action is causally condi-
tioned, and not all anti-determinists wish to say that 
free human action is "uncaused." To say what precisely 
these parties do wish to say and to find out whether 
their positions are in actual fact inconsistent (which 
compatibiilists deny) will require entering this debate 
further. But the point against Churchland has, however, 
been established: her statement of the freedom/deter-
minism debate is incorrect. 
This from a purely logical point of view invali-
dates Churchland*s particular argument against Eccles. 
However, her point does in fact hold in my opinion 
against anti-determinists who advance such PSRA. It 
must be argued, for such an argument to be successful, 
that the relationship between the act of coming to know 
the truth of a proposition and causal factors which 
determine one's belief is "purely accidental." As 
Jordan puts it, if determinism is true 
. . . whether anyone believes it, i.e., determin-
ism, and what he considers trustworthy evidence 
and acceptable principles of inference are deter-
mined altogether by conditions that have no as-
sured congruence with the proposition's own 
merits or with criteria of sound argumentation 
whose validity consists of more than that we ac-
cept them.14 
The argument here not only begs the question at issue 
but it misconstructs the determinist's position. The 
determinist would claim anything but that the act of 
coming to know the truth of a proposition and those 
causal factors which determine one's belief are merely 
"accidentally" or "randomly related," if this is meant 
to deny the very existence of the alleged causal 
connection. This is indeed self-contradictory, but is 
the fault of a mistaken argument of the anti-determi-
nist, not of the determinist. The consistent determin-
ist would not deny the brute facts that we do in fact 
reason philosophically. Rather our processes of reas-
oning are not free mental acts. 
This claim might strike the anti-determinist as 
being question-begging in turn, and the debate at this 
point threatens to collapse. However, this is not so. 
The determinist will need to defend this position by an 
argument. It makes sense to criticize an argument on 
the grounds that it begs the question at issue, but not 
the mere formulation of a position. What needs to be 
shown here by the anti-determinist, by an independent 
argument, is that the process of reasoning precludes 
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the acceptance of the thesis of determinism by any 
rational agent. Current PSRA are extremely problematic 
because they assume this from the onset. So while 
Churchland1s argument itself fails, her criticism of 
Eccles is quite correct. 
Before passing on to the second task of this paper 
some consideration to the PSRA of Boyle, Grisez and 
Tollefsen15 should be given in the light of the follow-
ing objection. They conceded that previous PSRA 
against determinism have failed insofar as they have 
begged the question against determinism. Determinism 
("Nfc") i s self-refuting because rational affirmation of this position requires excluding freedom of will 
("Sfc"), but the norms of rationality which we accept 
in our philosophical practices does not allow the ex-
clusion of Sfc, so Nfc cannot be rationally affirmed.16 
Rationality norms include "paradigmatic," "cre-
ative," "logical" and "technical" norms. Paradigmatic 
norms provide standards for the evaluation of the nor-
mality of members of a class. Logical norms provide 
standards for the evaluation of discourse as consistent 
and coherence. Creative norms provide standards for 
the evaluation of the components of some work with 
respect to their unification in the total project. 
Finally, technical norms provide standards for the 
evaluation of action as it is a necessary condition for 
achieving one's ends. Both kinds of normality are as-
serted to be consistent with Nfc. 1 7 Hence, neither of 
these kinds of normality entail Sfc. However, Boyle, 
Grisez and Tollefsen argue at some length that neither 
of these kinds ot normality can "exclude" Sfc. To take 
the logical norm, for example, Sfc would only be exclu-
ded if it was self-contradictory and contingent upon a 
successful critique of logical fatalism; Sfc does not 
appear to be excluded. 
The premiss in this PSRA which is problematic in my 
opinion is this: 
(P) If Nfc is rationally affirmed, then the condi-
tions obtain where Sfc is rationally excluded.18 
The defence of this premise is allegedly given in 
Chapter Five, section E, of the book. We are told, 
then, that for a champion of Nfc to advance Nfc, Nfc 
must be asserted as being true, or the most reasonable 
proposition to believe in a set of other propositions. 
In this sense it is quite correct to state that a cham-
pion of Nfc must rationally exclude Sfc. If this was 
not done one would be committed to accepting two propo-
sitions which are mutually contradictory: both are 
such that they cannot simultaneously be true. However, 
what the Nfc is not committed to, is denying that Sfc 
must be excluded because it violates a rationality 
norm. The Nfc would accept that Sfc should not be 
rejected on such grounds and would welcome Boyle, 
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Grisez and Tollefsen's argument to this effect. 
However, Sfc is rejected because the position is either 
false, or its arguments too weak to warrant rational 
assent, and the alleged PSRA collapses. The PSRA com-
mits an equivocation between the grounds upon which a 
proposition may be rationally affirmed or excluded, and 
whether in fact a proposition violates paradigmatic, 
creative, logical or technical norms. 
It is concluded that a sound PSRA against determin-
ism has yet to be produced. It seems unlikely that any 
such PSRA could be constructed on presently envisagea-
ble grounds. Determinism is a coherent, substantial 
and challenging philosophical position. It could be 
met by anti-determinists by much ontological work, in 
charting out alternative and more plausible views of 
mind, causality and space and time than those accepted 
by present determinists. Whether determinism is in 
fact true, or even a reasonable position cannot be 
debated here. 
3. A Critique of Everitt's Argument 
Nicholas Everitt has attempted to show by means of 
a PSRA that the doctrine of "straight-forward elimina-
tive materialism" (SEM) can not be rationally assented 
to by any cognitive agent. SEM, a thesis most frequen-
tly associated with Richard Rorty, 1 9 is the position 
that "there are no mental items, just as there are no 
unicorns.1,20 
The first problem which Everitt notes for the eli-
minative materialist is that he must, if this thesis is 
true, cease ascribing mental states, especially belief 
states, to himself. Yet to be an SEMist one must 
surely believe that one's thesis is true, and if so it 
is a necessary condition of an SEMist believing SEM 
that the thesis is in fact false. 
In reply to this the SEMist might be led down the 
path of topic neutrality (TN), and to an easy 
slaughter. The TN thesis is the position that there is 
nothing about mental items in virtue of which they must 
be physical or non-physical. The SEMist TN asserts 
that there are no M-beliefs (mentalistic-beliefs) and 
TN denies the truth of mentalism and TN believes that 
SEM is true. Everitt argues that if the SEMist accepts 
the p thesis, that there is something about mental 
items in virtue of which they must be physical, the 
SEMist has no reason to be an SEMist rather than an 
identity theorist. Second, the TN thesis and mentalism 
were rival accounts of the referential nature of mental 
terms. The problem which Everitt believes to remain 
outstanding for the SEMist is to explain an initial ac-
ceptance of mentalism, while one reasons to the accept-
ance of SEM independent of whether the p thesis is ac-
cepted once one has accepted SEM. 2 1 
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Everitt's first reconstruction of the SEM argument 
takes the SEMist to be presenting a sound argument to 
this conclusion: 
(CI) SEM is true. 
However, the SEMist must assent to this premise: 
(1) The SEMist believes that mentalism is true. 
The SEMist believes* that mentalism is true because 
if (1) was false, then no SEMist has any more reason to 
accept SEM than a mind-body identity thesis. Everitt 
also argues in a far from clear and in a far from 
satisfactory manner that "if there is to be a reason 
(as distinct from his mistakenly thinking there is a 
reason) for denying the existence of the mental, (2) 
must be true as well," 2 2 i.e., 
(2) The mentalism thesis is true. 
From (1) and (2) we deduce premise (3): 
(3) There is at least one non-physical mental item, 
this being the SEMist's belief that mentalism is 
true. 
Premise (3) is inconsistent with (CI) since from (CI) 
we can deduce a proposition (CI*): 
(CI*) There are no non-physical mental items 
and (3) and (CI*) are inconsistent since by the con-
junction rule we can deduce a proposition (CI**): 
(CI**) There is at least one non-physical mental item 
and there are no non-physical items 
which is an outright contradiction. It seems, then, 
that if Everitt's analysis is correct, he has not shown 
that SEM is pragmatically self-refuting (PSRA), but has 
advanced a much stronger thesis, nameiy that SEM is 
semantically self-refuting (SSRA). Let us call this 
argument, Argument A. 
A second argument. Argument B, involves epistemi-
cally weakening premise (2) of Argument A: 
(2a) The SEMist rationally believes that the mental-
ism thesis is true. 
This leaves open the possibility that mentalism is in 
fact false. The next premise would also seem accepta-
ble by a SEMist, Everitt alleges, who accepted (2a): 
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(4) The Semist believes that he holds at least some 
beliefs. 
From (2a) and (4) it is deduced that 
(5) It is rational for the SEMist to believe that 
there are at least some non-physical mental 
items, these being at least his own beliefs. 
From (2a), (4) and (5) it is deduced that 
(6) It is not rational for a SEMist to believe SEM. 
Argument C is advanced to block a possible rejoin-
der which could be made to a conception of rational be-
lief presupposed by Argument B: if it is rational for 
someone S to believe that p, and p is inconsistent with 
q, it is not rational for S to believe that q: S must 
reasonably believe that p and q are inconsistent. The 
SEMist enlightened by Argument B is faced by this 
argument: 
(C) . . . if the SEMist gives up his belief in SEM, 
then of course he is no longer an SEMist; if he gives 
up his belief that there are non-physical mental items, 
then he must also give up either the mentalism thesis 
or his belief that the holds some beliefs. If we as-
sume that the latter is contingently very improbable, 
all that is left is for him to abandon the mentalism 
thesis. But if he abandons the mentalism thesis, there 
is no reason for his materialism to be eliminative.23 
Argument C can be stated more explicitly as follows: 
(2) The mentalism thesis is true. 
(7) I have some beliefs. 
Therefore, 
(0) There are some non-physical mental items ((2), 
(7)). 
(9) (8) is inconsistent with SEM, by definition of 
"SEM". 
(10) if (8) is false, then either (2), (7) or both 
(2)) and (7) are false (as (2) and (7) entail 
(8)). 
(11) (7) is true. 
Therefore, 
(12) If (8) is false, then (2) is false ((10), (11)). 
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(13) If (2) is false, then SEM has no adequate 
rationale. 
Therefore, 
(14) If (8) is false, then SEM has no adequate 
rationale. 
(15) If (8) is true,then SEM is false (9). 
Therefore, 
(16) Either SEM is false or SEM has no adequate 
rationale ((14), (15)). 
This trio of arguments presents a prima facie 
strong challenge to SEM, but it is a challenge" which 
the SEMist can meet. My criticism here will centre 
upon premises (2) and (2a), and contrary to Everitt, 
the SEMist need not accept these premises precisely as 
he has stated them. Consequently all three arguments 
are unsound. 
First let us be clear about what mentalism in fact 
is. Mentalism is the thesis, according to Everitt, 
which asserts this: 
(Ml) The mental, if it exists, is non-physical.24 
The assertion (Ml) can be restated, without changing 
either its sense or truth value, as (M2): 
(M2) If the mental exists then the mental is non-
physical . 
Is it in fact the case that the SEMist accepts (M2)? 
Yes, indeed it does seem to be so. So let us next 
review what the SEM thesis is. SEM is the following 
claim: 
(SEM*) If SEM is true, then there are no mental items 
(just as there are no unicorns). 
It seems though that even the mentalist would accept 
(SEM*). (SEM*) is in fact a necessary truth, the 
source of its necessity deriving from the definition of 
the SEMist position itself. However the mentalist 
would argue that there are in fact mental items, while 
the elimmative materialist would deny this. The 
SEMist can accept both propositions (M2) and (SEM*) 
because they are in fact necessary truths. But this is 
consistent with the assertion that "mentalism" is false 
insofar as the mental does not exist. Hence the men-
talist position must encompass not only an acceptance 
of (M2) but also this claim: 
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(M3) The mental exists. 
Everitt*s challenge to SEMists is to explain how in 
fact one can initially accept "mentalism", yet argue 
for SEM. I have pointed out that the SEMist does not 
in fact accept mentalism insofar as mentalism is the 
claim (M2) and (M3). What I must now do is to outline 
how in fact a philosopher might come to believe a the-
sis which is so challenging to our common sense view of 
the world as SEM. 
The reasoning here is quite simple. The SEMist 
does in fact believe that the common sense view of the 
world is very seriously flawed. The SEM would argue 
that such a world view does not consitute a pre-
theoretical given, because common sense positions con-
tain metaphysical assumptions. Yet philosophy, while 
it cannot help but begin with common sense positions 
(since the philosopher must grow up in a human 
society), has never been content with accepting tradi-
tional cultural wisdom. Philosophers have and should 
challenge the wisdom of the status quo. And this is 
precisely what has occurred in the history of 
philosophy. Zeno attacked such a well entrenched view 
that things in fact undergo change in the world, and 
that there is plurality at all. Sceptics have denied 
that we know anything at all, and eliminative material-
ists have denied both that the mental entities of ordi-
nary language exist, as well as the material objects of 
ordinary language.25 
The SEMist claims that future neurophysiological 
research may well lead us to conclude that the 
mentalist 's mental entities are in fact brain 
processes. The relationship of these mental entity 
terms to the theoretical entity terms of a future neu-
rophysiology would be the same as that which holds 
between a theoretically eliminated term such as 
"quantity of caloric fluid" and an at present accepted 
term such as "the mean kinetic energy of molecules." 
From the perspective of contemporary thermodynamics the 
referent of the former term does not exist, and the ob-
servational and explanatory role once played by such a 
term is taken over by thermodynamics. Likewise, a lin-
guistic reform may in fact occur whereby the observa-
tional and explanatory role played by mentalistic terms 
may be taken over by the SEMist*s neurophysiological 
language. At this point, it justifiably could be said 
by the SEMist that mental items do not exist, just as 
it is said that caloric fluid and vital spirits do not 
exist. 
The SEMist is proposing a quite radical modifica-
tion of our present view of the world. Paul 
Churchland26 imagines a new form of "language" which 
"could be learned and used by our innate systems . . 
since it would reflect the underlying structure of our 
cognitive activities in greater detail than does nat-
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ural language".27 Compound "strings" of this new mode 
of communication (uebersaetzen) are not evaluated as 
true or false, and what we at present take as relations 
of entailment will no longer hold between uebersaetzen 
components. Philosophical argument itself"will have 
then become a thing of the past. Richard Rorty, in 
fact believes that the received view of philosophy is 
already not only a degenerating research programme, but 
one already decayed.28 He himself suggests the 
replacement of philosophy by hermeneutics; The radical 
SEMist would no doubt construct some uebersaetzen ac-
tivity to busy any of today's philosophers wHbse work-
ing life extends into this social order. 
If this sketch of the SEMist programme is accurate, 
then Everitt's argument does in fact beg the question 
against the SEMist. The SEMist is proposing not only a 
conceptual-technological revolution, but a socio-
institutional revolution more radical than that ever 
conceived by social theorists. The Anti-SEMist stands 
in the same position as for example a liberal theorist 
defending the inevitability of capitalist against a 
Marxist, on the grounds that the acquisition and pos-
session of private property by individuals is a neces-
sary condition for a flourishing life of the individu-
als as well as for social harmony. The argument in the 
latter case presupposes the inevitability of those very 
social institutions, and a view of human nature which 
the Marxist explicitly rejects. In the former case, 
the question is also begged, since a common sense world 
view is assumed, and it is the inevitability of this 
position which the radical SEM questions. 
Perhaps SEM would be incoherent if there was in 
fact a transcendental argument demonstrating the ab-
solute necessity of commonsense concepts. But such a 
strategy faces two problems. First, the question of 
the justification of transcendental modes of argumenta-
tion is an outstanding philosophical controversy. 
Second, it must fail against Paul Churchland's scenario 
of the abandonment of natural language and its replace-
ment by uebersaetzen, since it seems questions of truth 
and falsity and validity will no longer arise, and 
questions of argumentation are then necessarily out of 
the question. Consequently such a radical SEM pro-
gramme could only be implemented or not implemented; it 
could not be argued for. Its acceptance or rejection is then a political question. 
Self-referential arguments are a powerful philo-
sophical weapon of critique. However, there are ways 
of escaping such arguments. This is not to say that 
determinism and SEM are true or even reasonable. Both 
positions can be criticized, but most plausibly from 
the perspective of an alternative comprehensive meta-
physical system which would allow a transcendence of 
both philosophical problems. Let us audition for such 
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reconstructions, but not on the basis of self-
referential arguments. 
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